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Abstract
In the face of a pandemic, urban protests, and an affordability crisis, is the desirability of
dense urban settings at a turning point? Assessing cities’ long term trends remains challenging.
The first part of this chapter describes the short-run dynamics of the housing market in 2020.
Evidence from prices and price-to-rent ratios suggests expectations of resilience. Zip-level evi-
dence suggests a short-run trend towards suburbanization, and some impacts of urban protests
on house prices. The second part of the chapter analyzes the long-run dynamics of urban growth
between 1970 and 2010. It analyzes what, in such urban growth, is explained by short-run shocks
as opposed to fundamentals such as education, industrial specialization, industrial diversifica-
tion, urban segregation, and housing supply elasticity. This chapter’s original results as well as
a large established body of literature suggest that fundamentals are the key drivers of growth.
The chapter illustrates this finding with two case studies: the New York City housing market
after September 11, 2001; and the San Francisco Bay Area in the aftermath of the 1989 Loma
Prieta earthquake. Both areas rebounded strongly after these shocks, suggesting the resilience
of the urban metropolis.
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1 Introduction
Between 55% (United Nations Population Division) and 85% (European Commission) of world
population lives in urban areas. Such population is concentrated on a small share of the world’s
landmass: between 0.45% (Liu, He, Zhou, Wu, 2014) and 1.5% (European Commission) depending
on the estimates. The spatial concentration of location choices can be explained by agglomeration
economies: a key mechanism that enables the description of the spatial distribution of location
choices and economic activity using the tools of general equilibrium. The basic mechanisms of
agglomeration economies were described as early as in Marshall’s (1890) Principles of Economics,
and are the essential ingredient in spatial models, including Fujita & Thisse (1996) and Behrens &
Robert-Nicoud (2015). Agglomeration enables the sharing of common resources, the matching with
potential employers, buyers, sellers, partners; it also enables learning and social interactions. Dense
urban living makes workers more productive (Puga 2010). Agglomeration economics underpin the
emergence and growth of cities (Duranton & Puga 2004). Efforts to estimate the magnitude of
agglomeration economies are described in Rosenthal & Strange (2004), Melo, Graham & Noland
(2009) and Combes & Gobillon (2015).
Recent events have raised concerns that the benefits of agglomeration may be declining, affecting
the desirability of urban living; perhaps even triggering an exodus from cities. The high density of
urban setting suggests that, over long periods of time, the benefits of agglomeration have typically
outstripped the costs of living in urban settings. These include traffic congestion (Duranton &
Turner 2011), potential health hazards (Moore, Gould & Keary 2003)1, labor poaching (Combes &
Duranton 2006).
At least two shocks have affected urban areas in 2020: the Covid-19 pandemic and urban protests.
Anecdotal evidence, statements by public officials as well as descriptive statistics suggest a positive
correlation between urban density and the number of confirmed Covid-19 cases per capita.2 In
addition, urban protests focusing on racial justice have taken place in 43% of the 917 metropolitan
1The causal impact of urbanization on health is ambiguous. For instance Singh & Siahpush (2014) displays a life
expectancy that is 2.7 year longer in urban areas vs rural areas of the United States. Urbanization can lead to worse
health outcomes in urban slums (Riley, Ko, Unger, Reis). While statistical correlations also suggest that urbanization
is a necessary condition for growth, there are examples of urbanization without growth, e.g. in Sub-Saharan Africa
and in South Asia (Annez and Buckley, Chapter 1 in Spence, Annez, Buckley, 2009; Chauvin, Glaeser, Ma, Tobio,
2017).
2Table 1 presents regressions suggesting a statistically significant positive correlation between county population
density and confirmed cases per capita.
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areas in May 2020.3 Thus a key question is whether the multiple short-run shocks to urban housing
markets are likely to cause a long-term decline in metropolitan population growth. Will advances
in information technology coupled with the challenges of living in dense neighborhoods lead to a
decline of urban living, with a population living farther away from the densest cities? The answer
is ultimately an empirical question, that can be informed by the analysis of (i) the nature of recent
short-run shocks to local housing demand, and (ii) the importance of short-run shocks versus long-
run fundamentals for the growth of metropolitan areas.
This chapter presents an analysis of the short-run shocks to the housing market in 2020 using
Zip-level housing data. As the long-term prospects of U.S. urban housing markets cannot yet be
assessed, the chapter turns to the past to inform the future. The chapter performs an analysis of the
long-term 1970-2010 growth trends of 306 metropolitan areas. It then presents two Zip-level case
studies of the long-term resilience of New York City’s housing market after September 11, 2001, and
of the long-term resilience of the San Francisco Bay area after the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake.
By combining micro data on Covid-19 infections, geocoded urban protests with census demo-
graphics, house prices, inventories, and rents, the chapter documents the large magnitude of the
series of shocks that affected U.S. housing markets in 2020: prices, inventories, rents all experi-
enced large movements. Yet, despite such large shocks, the dynamic of prices is consistent with the
market’s expectations of resilience. There is also evidence that, within metropolitan areas, housing
demand is increasing faster in less dense neighborhoods and in neighborhoods farther away from
the center of the metropolitan area. This is consistent with, at least in the short-run, households’
adaptation to changing conditions by demanding housing in locations farther away from the impact
of the short-run shocks.
The second part of the chapter uses longitudinal time series of census tracts with consistent 2010
boundaries to estimate the impact of fundamentals and shocks on the population growth in 306
metropolitan areas.4 Results suggest no statistically significant impact of shocks such as hurricanes
and urban protests. This may be surprising given the experience of New Orleans: in 2018 population
was 16% lower than its pre-hurricane 2005 level. Yet, in other metropolitan areas, billion dollar
3This statistic uses geocoded protest location data and Zillow’s definition of metropolitan area boundaries. These
data are described in Section 2.4.
4Recent data includes information on more than 900 metropolitan areas. The 1970-2010 longitudinal data of the
Neighborhood Change Database allows an analysis of 306 metropolitan areas.
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events such as hurricane Harvey and hurricane Sandy had no discernible impact on metropolitan
population levels. Beyond differences in the hydrology and topography of New Orleans, Houston,
and New York, a set of economic differences in fundamentals may explain the divergent long-term
paths in response to short-run shocks. This may also explain why Collins & Margo (2007) finds a
long-run impact of the 1967 Detroit riots (a short-run shock) on long-run population growth and
on property values. Detroit’s population peaked in 1950, 17 years before the riots. Glaeser (2011)
argues that Detroit’s industrial mono-culture may have hindered innovation. Hence the shock of the
riots may have been correlated with or driven by economic fundamentals such as Detroit’s relatively
lower industrial diversification and high level of racial segregation. This chapter’s description of the
importance of shocks vs. fundamentals does not establish that shocks do not affect metropolitan
population growth (Boustan, Kahn, Rhode & Yanguas (2020) describes impacts on outmigration
and income) but rather that fundamentals may outweigh their impacts.
The chapter also presents a case study of the resilience of local housing markets in the aftermath
of September 11, 2001 in New York. There is evidence of a short-run reversal of the gradient between
price appreciation and distance to the Central Business District during the September–December
2001 period. Yet the gradient returns to its prior, long-term, negative slope whereby price appre-
ciation is higher in the CBD. There is no impact of the event on house price appreciation from
2002 onward. Similar findings emerge in this chapter’s second case study, the impact of the 1989
Loma Prieta earthquake on San Francisco’s housing markets. While there are visible population
outflows in the 1990 Census in areas affected by the earthquake, there is no long term difference in
population trends across areas with different earthquake risks. Large corporate headquarters have
sprung up in those areas at risk of earthquakes. Overall the metro-level and the neighborhood-level
evidence are consistent with the resilience of urban housing markets, whereby fundamentals drive
metropolitan growth rather than short-run shocks.
This chapter’s findings are consistent with prior literature. Davis & Weinstein (2002) documents
the evolution of Japanese cities from the Stone Age to the modern era, with a specific focus on the
impacts of World War II bombing on the growth of Japanese cities. They document a strong recovery
in the years immediately after such an unprecedented shock to city population. Brakman, Garretsen
& Schramm (2004) documents that this is also true of German cities strategically bombed during
World War II: the impact on city growth is only temporary. Davis & Weinstein (2002) emphasizes
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the importance of locational fundamentals. This chapter emphasizes the importance of fundamentals
such as education, industrial composition, and urban segregation. In other words, it can be argued
that while resources such as coal or proximity to major streams may have determined the emergence
of cities, it is their education levels, their diverse economic activity, and the opportunity to interact
and learn that is the modern foundation of urban living.
This chapter’s results also suggest that housing supply elasticity is a positive driver of metropoli-
tan population growth. Limited housing supply elasticity in some metropolitan areas might be
driving recent population outflows from California to more affordable housing markets in Texas,
Arizona, Nevada, and other states. Zabel (2012) finds that the cost of housing is a driver of labor
mobility across metropolitan areas during the 1990-2006 period. Limited housing supply elastic-
ity may be hindering recovery after shocks. Koster, van Ommeren & Rietveld (2012) argues that
planning policies may have hindered the rebuilding of bombed areas in Rotterdam after World War
II.
Finally, this chapter’s findings are also consistent with prior work on pandemics and housing
markets. Francke & Korevaar (2020) finds only short-run impacts on house prices and rents of the
17th century plague in Amsterdam of 19th century cholera in Paris. These effects are short-lived as
they do not last more than a year. These results are also consistent with the Canadian experience of
the SARS pandemic. On April 23, 2003, the World Health Organization issued a travel advisory for
Toronto recommending postponing all but essential travel. There is however no evidence of impacts
of SARS infections on the growth of Toronto’s housing markets (prices and transaction volumes) in
2003 and beyond. The Teranet index displays a 5% year-on-year house price increase throughout
2003. Price increases remain strong in subsequent years, reaching 7-9% between October 2007 and
May 2008. This may be due to the relatively limited number of SARS cases in Toronto. This is also
consistent with a model in which house prices capitalize the entire flow of future rents and thus are
resilient in the face of short-run shocks such as pandemics.
Overall, the results described in this chapter imply that metropolitan areas may be on an
equilibrium path, and that shocks are short run deviation from this single dynamic equilibrium.
Davis & Weinstein (2008) finds no evidence of multiple equilibria in cities’ dynamics, using data for
114 Japanese cities. This paper finds that industrial composition and the size of the manufacturing
sector are unchanged after large shocks to city population and employment. This resilience may be
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due to the quality of institutions of high-income countries (Kahn 2005).
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the ongoing shocks experienced by U.S.
housing markets since March 2020, and their impact on market dynamics. Section 3 describes long-
run 1970–2010 evidence of the drivers of metropolitan population growth, as well as new evidence
of the impact of September 11, and the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake on neighborhood dynamics.
Section 4 provides a cautious forecast of urban resilience in the face of the 2020 shocks.
2 The U.S. Housing Market in 2020: Resilience and Adaptation
2.1 Short-Run Aggregate Dynamics: Insights from Prices and Rents
Time series of house prices, listings, and rents suggests that 2020 is a major shock to real estate
dynamics. It also provides evidence about the market’s expectation of resilience. We describe the
dynamics using Zillow’s time series data and interpret them using standard principles of real estate:
while rents reveal the current flow value of housing, prices capitalize current and future flow values.
This section uses metro-level time series. In the next section we focus on smaller, more granular,
local housing market dynamics at the 5-digit ZIP code level.
Figure 1a presents the year-on-year change in the Zillow House Value Index (ZHVI) between
January 31, 2015 and July 3, 2020. This price index is built using a repeat-sales methodology similar
to Case & Shiller (1987). The bold line is for the United States, the dashed line for the tristate
metropolitan area of New York; and the dotted line for the metropolitan area of Los Angeles. All
three series suggest that after a deceleration of prices in 2019, transaction prices experienced an
accelerating growth from January till July 2020. Perhaps surprisingly, such deceleration did not
soften during the Covid-19 pandemic, but rather price growth accelerated, reaching year-on-year
levels above 4% in July.
The dynamic of rents is rather different, and reconciling this apparently contradictory dynamics
provides new insights. Figure 1b displays the year-on-year change in the Zillow Observed Rent
Index (ZORI), which measures changes in asking rents over a sample of properties. By measuring
rents for the same units, this index is akin to a “repeat-rent” index. Hence this index is built with a
similar method as the house value index. The figure suggests that rent growth not only decelerated,
but rents decreased in the metro area of New York, dropping by more than 2% year-on-year in
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July 2020. In the United States overall and in Los Angeles, rents are close to declining. Figure 1d
presents the metro-level distribution of average year-on-year changes during the March to August
2020 period, for the 100 largest metropolitan areas. It suggests that overall prices have increased
faster than rents, with a significant number of metropolitan areas experiencing rent declines or
stagnation; while there is only one metro area with price declines.
Listings experience the largest drop. Figure 1c suggests that listings started decreasing signif-
icantly at the beginning of the pandemic, dropping year-on-year by 20% in the U.S. and by up to
40% in Los Angeles, with a rebound in June-July 2020. This presents a first hypothesis for the seem-
ingly paradoxical increase in prices. A first hypothesis is selection bias. Houses that do not transact
during a given time period do not contribute to a repeat sales index by construction, and houses in
the lower part of the price distribution are more likely to experience no transaction during down-
turns (Ouazad & Rancière 2019). While houses that do transact experience price increases, houses
whose value is declining might not contribute to the set of observations of the price index. Hence
part of the index’s fluctuations may simply be due to dynamic selection (Gatzlaff & Haurin 1997).
This possibility nevertheless is unlikely to explain the observed price and rent trends. First, both
the price index and the rent index are vulnerable to this selection bias. Second, one econometric ap-
proach to correcting for such selection bias, the inverse time weighting approach (Ambrose, Coulson
& Yoshida 2015), does not typically yield significant differences in the price index.
Three alternative mechanisms rationalize the evolution of the housing market’s trends. The
simplest way to express them is using the Gordon & Shapiro (1956) approach. Such approach
capitalizes expected rents using a constant discount factor and a constant expected growth rate of
rents. Rents are net of maintenance costs, property taxes, and potential credit costs. Formally,
R
P
= r − g, (1)
where R is the current net rent, P the current value of the asset, r the required capital yield, and
g the growth rate of net rents. This can be written as P = Rr−g , suggesting that prices may increase
even as current rents fall whenever (i) the expected growth rate of rents increases, (ii) the rate of
return r declines, (iii) net rents increase relative to gross rents due, for instance, to a decline in
credit costs.
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Figure 2a shows that as expected, the increase in prices and the decline of rents implies a declining
rent-to-price ratio, which is the outcome of at least these three potential mechanisms. First, the de-
cline in the 30-year fixed rate mortgage average (Figure 2b) lowers interest costs and pushes prices up
at given rents. The impact of cheap mortgage credit on house prices has been documented (Adelino,
Schoar & Severino 2012, Favara & Imbs 2015, Justiniano, Primiceri & Tambalotti 2019). Second,
the decline in the AAA corporate bond yield (Figure 2c) suggests that prices are increasing in a
search for yields. The required rate of return on capital can be approximated by such a safe bond
yield plus a risk premium. Third, the increase in prices and the decline of the price-to-rent ratio is
consistent with expectations of rent growth; while current rents may be low, buyers are arguably
expecting substantial future rent growth. Figure 2d plots expectations of price and rent growth
using the time series of Fannie Mae’s National Housing Survey. While expectations of rent growth
(g) fall sharply in June 2020, they rebound and become positive again in July 2020, suggesting that
housing market participants expect a short-lived trough in rents rather than a prolonged slowdown.
2.2 Covid-19 Cases:
Greater Frictions, Declining Rents, Resilient Prices
The global Covid-19 pandemic affected housing markets throughout the world. Yet, the spatial
distribution of confirmed cases and deaths is uneven. The pandemic emerged in the United States
as a significant measurable phenomenon in the first half of March 2020. While daily confirmed cases
were below 70 a day on March 5th, they grew to a peak of more than 77,000 cases a day on July
16th 2020 for a total of 5.9 million cases as of August 29, 2020.5 On the same day, Canada had
reached a total confirmed number of cases of more than 129,000 cases.
Figure 3a presents the spatial distribution of cases per capita across Zillow’s metropolitan hous-
ing markets. The colors corresponds to quantiles of cases per capita. This map suggests that
Covid-19 infections reached most housing markets, with an average number of confirmed cases per
100 residents of between no confirmed case (three metros of Utah: Cedar City, Price, and Saint
George) and a maximum of 9 cases per 100 residents (Alta, Indiana). As expected, the largest
metropolitan areas host the largest number of total confirmed cases, with 543,000 cases in New
York, 282,476 in Los Angeles. With the exception of Riverside, California, the largest numbers of
5This chapter was written in September 2020.
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cases are all in the 10 largest metropolitan areas by population.
Table 1 performs a county-level regression of confirmed cases per capita on a range of variables
from the American Community Survey. Density is measured by the ratio of county population on the
county’s area in squared kilometers. The log density is a more relevant measure than density itself
as the regression is less driven by extreme observations. The regression includes state fixed effects
– results are unaffected by the inclusion of state fixed effects. The table displays an economically
and statistically significant correlation between county log density and confirmed cases per capita
regardless of the inclusion of additional controls.
We match such cases by population to shifts in inventories to document a substantial and
significant correlation between the decline in real estate inventories and the number of cases per
population. This is depicted in Figure 3b. The vertical axis is the average year-on-year percentage
change in inventories over the March to August 2020 period. The horizontal axis is the number
of cases per population, where the total number of confirmed cases is from the Johns Hopkins
Coronavirus Research Center; and county-level population aggregated to Zillow’s metro areas is
from the 2018 American Community Survey.6 The pandemic affected the ability of homeowners to
sell and of buyers to acquire a property, likely increasing search frictions and leading to inefficiencies.
There is no metropolitan area with cases per population above the median and inventory growth
above the median. Charleston, South Carolina, with more than 3 cases per 100,7 experienced a
4% decline in inventories. New Orleans, with 3.1 cases per 100, experienced a 3.7% decline in
inventories. In contrast, some of the largest increases in inventories happened in metropolitan areas
with low case numbers: San Francisco, with only 1.1 cases per 100, experienced a +3.2% increase
in listings.
There is no detectable metro-level correlation between house price dynamics and the number of
confirmed cases, suggesting that the impact of the pandemic may be more likely to stem from the
economic consequences of the pandemic rather than through the avoidance of infection probabilities.
Figure 3c plots the average monthly change in prices for each of the largest 100 metros against the
number of cases per population. It suggests that prices are largely unrelated to confirmed cases,
6While 2020 county-level population numbers have not yet been released, a similar correlation would arguably
hold with updated data.
7Confirmed cases are also reported as cases per million. Using this alternative scaling does not affect this chapter’s
analysis.
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with a large variance of up to 20 percentage points, in house price changes for metros with low
infection numbers. And no significant difference between metros with low infection numbers and
metros with high infection numbers.
Evidence may come from the correlation between rents and infection numbers. Figure 3d plots
the average change in rents against the number of cases per population. Metro areas with large num-
bers of cases per population experienced lower than average rent growth. In contrast, metropolitan
areas with low case counts per population experienced some of the largest rent growth levels.
These three pieces of evidence (on inventories, prices, rents) suggest a substantial short-run
impact of the pandemic on the flow utility of housing in metro areas affected by the pandemic,
but a long-run expectation of resilience whereby the pandemic does not significantly affect buyers’
expectations of the value of living in metro areas with large cases per population.
2.3 Evidence of Short-Run Suburbanization
While house prices are overall on the rise, there may be within-city shifts in demand towards
neighborhoods that are less dense and farther away from the central business district, which are
arguably less exposed to the pandemic. Anecdotal evidence8 suggests that cities may become
more resilient when households increase their demand for less dense areas where the propensity
for infections is perceived to be lower.9 To perform this analysis, we turn to neighborhood-level
evidence from the New York City metro area.
Figure 4 presents the example of two neighborhoods with two extreme density levels. The upper
panel (a) presents the Upper East Side, with a population density of 53,029 residents per squared
kilometer as of 2018. It features condominium towers and other high density urban developments.
Such density is higher than the average density of the densest cities in the world. This stands in con-
trast with New York’s Great Neck Peninsula (lower panel (b)), on the northern side of Long Island,
with a population density 18 times lower, of 2,968 residents per squared kilometer. While commut-
ing time from Great Neck to downtown Manhattan is less than half an hour, this neighborhood has
more than 20 parks across 9 villages, and features “verdant residential areas.”10
8“New Yorkers Look To Suburbs And Beyond. Other City Dwellers May Be Next”, National Public Radio, July
8, 2020. “New Yorkers Are Fleeing to the Suburbs: ‘The Demand Is Insane’“, New York Times, August 30, 2020.
9While many other factors than density explains the variance of cases across locations, there is a significant and
positive correlation between population density and cases per capita, as displayed in Table 1.
10Marcelle Sussman Fischer, the New York Times, July 2016.
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We test whether neighborhoods such as the Upper East Side have seen a decline in demand
relative to neighborhoods such as Great Neck during the period of March to August 2020. We
do so by regressing shifts in prices on 1) the distance to the population-weighted center of the
metropolitan area, 2) population density, as the ratio of the 2018 ACS population over the area of
the ZIP Code Tabulation Area in squared kilometers.
The results are presented in the scatter plot of Figure 5 and in Table 2. These scatter plots
and the regression table suggest a reversal in patterns of housing demand during the pandemic.
Indeed, the correlation between house price appreciation and density is positive in the three months
of March-May 2019. That is also true for other periods outside the pandemic. The correlation
between house price appreciation and urban density is also positive in the same time period of
2019, one year before the pandemic. Yet these two correlations turn negative and significant at
1% in the three months of March to May 2020. As the supply of housing moves slowly in the
short-run, fluctuations in house prices between March and August are likely a good measure of the
shift in the demand for housing units, vacating less desirable locations, and searching for housing
in more desirable locations. Hence correlations between the characteristics of neighborhoods and
shifts in transaction prices are likely a relevant proxy for shifts in tastes. These results suggest
that, in the short-run, household demand has adapted by shifting to less dense and more peripheral
neighborhoods.
2.4 Local Housing Markets and the May 2020 Urban Protests
The year 2020 saw a second series of shocks affecting urban housing markets. Urban protests in
response to alleged actions by the police started in May 2020 and quickly spread to a substantial
number of U.S. metropolitan housing markets. Figure 6a presents the geographic location of the
May 2020 protests with more than 100 participants according to the geocoded crowdsourcing of the
Wikimedia foundation.11 The spatial extent of these protests exceeds those of the 1968 protests
as documented by Stanford University’s Susan Olzak in her collection of Ethnic Collective Action
in Contemporary United States. This suggests that the 2020 urban protests may be the largest
protests in U.S. history. Whether protests lead to positive reforms that improve the desirability of
11Other potential sources of recent geocoded data include the Crowd Counting Consortium. Further literature may
focus on Factiva’s news archive as an alternative source of information on protests.
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urban living; or whether protests lower the quality of life in urban metros is an empirical question.
Collins & Margo (2007) uses decennial Census data between 1950 and 1980 to describe the
long-term impact of the 1960s riots on property values. They suggest that riots led to a decline of
property values, and in particular to a decline in black-owned property values, with no rebound in
the 1970s. The perhaps most salient example of such decline is the city of Detroit. In this context,
Glaeser & Gyourko (2005) argues that shocks may lead to a long decline in metropolitan areas as
the supply curve of housing is L-shaped: a decline in housing demand may lead to a decline in
house prices down to the marginal cost of housing, leading to larger vacancy levels, attracting lower
productivity workers and lowering the benefits of agglomeration economies.
Figures 6b and 6c present a correlational analysis of urban protests and house prices in the
metropolitan area of Los Angeles. Figures 6b presents evidence that George Floyd protests extended
from the northern neighborhood of San Fernando to the southern neighborhoods of Laguna Niguel.
Figure 6c compares house price appreciation in ZIP codes where a protest happened (red line) to
house price appreciation in ZIP codes where a protest did not occur (black). While the hypothesis
that the appreciation rates are parallel cannot be rejected statistically prior to May 2020, the
appreciation rate declines and crosses the appreciation rate of ZIP codes where a protest did not
occur. Hence, while on average across the United States, house price increases suggest expectations
of urban resilience, there is local evidence of some expectations of decline in specific neighborhoods
affected by the urban protests. This may be driven by the shift of demand towards neighborhoods
less exposed to risk.
The endogeneity of riots may cast doubt on the causal interpretation of such event studies that
rely on a pre-post analysis of the impact of riots on urban growth and decline. DiPasquale & Glaeser
(1998) finds support for a Beckerian mechanism in which protests are the outcome of a comparison
between the opportunity cost of time and the potential cost of punishment, and consistent with
evidence by Esteban & Ray (2011), the paper finds that ethnic diversity matters. In the case of
Los Angeles in May 2020, evidence suggests significant differences in the demographics of Zips with
urban protests and without urban protests.
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Mean
Protest Zips Other Zips Difference S.E. t
Frac. African American 0.054 0.084 −0.029 (0.019) −1.56
Frac. Hispanic 0.372 0.406 −0.034 (0.041) −0.82
Frac. Asian 0.219 0.186 +0.032 (0.025) +1.27
Frac. Owner Occupied 0.545 0.479 +0.066 (0.033) +1.98
log(Median Household Income) 11.257 11.116 +0.141 (0.063) +2.22
Frac. Poverty 0.124 0.154 −0.030 (0.016) −1.82
Frac. No Health Coverage 0.113 0.133 −0.020 (0.012) −1.70
In particular, this table suggests that protests occurred in neighborhoods that had significantly
higher household income, lower shares of African Americans and Hispanics, higher shares of owner-
occupied housing, lower poverty rates, and lower fractions of households with no health coverage. In
the future, longer time series combined with sound identification strategies may allow for a causal
analysis of the 2020 protests on urban housing markets.
3 Housing Markets in the Long Run:
The Role of Shocks vs. Initial Conditions
The previous section described the short-run response of U.S. housing markets to the pandemic
and the urban protests. The long-run prospect is yet unknown. The past can nevertheless inform
our perception of future trends. This section describes the long-run evolution of metropolitan areas
between 1970 and 2010 using longitudinal census tract data. It sheds light on the drivers of the
rise and decline of cities. Are cities that experience large short-run shocks rebounding or are the
typical impacts permanent shifts in population levels? Prior literature (Gabaix 1999, Ioannides &
Overman 2003) has described the relative stability of city size distributions, which follow Zipf’s
law, where the log population is a linear relationship to the log rank of the metropolitan area. Yet,
within such distribution, metro areas rise and fall. Understanding which observable characteristics
drive such rise and fall is the focus of the first section 3.1. While metropolitan area rankings tend
to be stable, the desirability of specific neighborhoods within metropolitan areas changes more
dramatically over time. This is the focus of subsections 3.2 and 3.3. We present two case studies:
the New York housing market in the aftermath of September 11; and the dynamic of San Francisco’s
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neighborhoods after the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake.
3.1 Explaining Metropolitan Growth in the Long Run
The relative ranking of metropolitan areas is stable over time: data from the Neighborhood Change
Database suggests that the correlation between a metropolitan area’s population rank in 1970 and
its rank in 2010 is 0.8, implying that the best predictor of a city’s future is its past. Rankings are
also stable in other dimensions than population: Kerr & Robert-Nicoud (2020) shows that 1975-
1980 annual patent count is a strong predictor of 2013-2018 patent count. Yet, some metropolitan
areas experience rapid population shifts: the Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington went from being the 11th
most populus metro to the number 4 rank. The Atlanta metropolitan area went from the 19th to
the 9th rank, joining the 10 largest metro areas. In contrast, Pittsburgh went down 13 notches,
from the 9th most populous metro to the 22nd most populous, as the steel industry declined. Two
of the largest relative growth levels were observed in Las Vegas, going from the 102nd to the 31st
largest; and the Austin–Round Rock metropolitan area, jumping 58 spots to the 35th rank.
The largest relative decline is that of Johnstown, Pennsylvania going from the 150th to the 249th
spot, with a 50.6% decline in population; this metropolitan area experienced three major floods, the
most recent in 1977. This major flood could be a candidate for a causal driver of the city’s decline.
Another competing explanation for this decline is Johnstown’s specialization in the steel industry,
with steel mill plants in the heart of its downtown.
Hence, for Johnstown as for other metropolitan areas, a key question is whether shocks (here
floods) or fundamentals (here industrial composition) explain their rise and fall? We use data
from a range of sources to estimate the correlation between urban growth and (i) natural disasters,
(ii) urban protests, (iii) industrial composition, (iv) education levels, (v) urban segregation, and
(vi) housing supply elasticity. Each of these hypothesis has received support in the literature. The
analysis of this chapter is not comprehensive, yet provides an overview of the potential drivers of
urban growth and decline.
The “Shocks” Hypothesis
• Natural Disasters
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Natural disasters may cause either temporary or permanent shifts in population levels. We use data
from NOAA’s significant storm events, which provides damages and fatalities at the county level
since January 1950. We count the number of billion dollar storms for each county in the 1970-2010
period. The metropolitan area with the largest number of such storms is the New Orleans–Metairie,
LA CBSA, with 12 billion dollar storms. Then comes the Gulfport-Biloxi-Pascagoula, MS CBSA,
with 6 such storms, and the Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX CBSA, with also 6 such
storms. The New Orleans CBSA is also the metropolitan area with the largest amount of billion
dollar damages. We consider three variables explaining metropolitan growth: the number of events,
the total property damages, and whether there was any event.
• Urban Protests
We test the urban protest hypothesis using data collected by Susan Olzak on Ethnic Collective
Action in the United States Olzak &West (1995). The list of events was compiled from the New York
Times Index and from microfilms of New York Times articles. We focus on protests occuring between
1970 and the last date of the file, 1992. The data reports the number of protestors, the involvement of
police, damage to property, the presence of non residents, and other features, for each metropolitan
area. We match the now deprecated Standard Metropolitan Area (SMSA) geographies to the 2010
Core Based Statistical Area, which is the most recent definition of metropolitan boundaries.
The “Fundamentals” Hypothesis
We compare the impact of shocks to the impact of the following fundamentals: education, industrial
composition, segregation, and housing supply elasticity. In each case, we describe the associated
literature and the data used.
• Industrial Composition
Initial industrial composition may matter for long term metropolitan growth through a number of
channels. First, specialization in industries with strong global demand for their products may lead
to a greater demand for labor in the metropolitan area. This is the intuition of Bartik (1991) and
Blanchard & Katz (1992).12 Second, the diversity of industries initially present in a metropolitan
12For a discussion of this empirical approach, see Goldsmith-Pinkham, Sorkin & Swift (2018).
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area may foster the growth of a variety of industries that depend on an economic fabric of different
suppliers and different customers. This is the industrial diversification hypothesis, perhaps most
saliently popularized by Jane Jacobs in the Death and Life of Great American Cities: “Typically
[small manufacturers] must draw on many and varied supplies and skills outside themselves, they
must serve a narrow market at the point where a market exists, and they must be sensitive to quick
changes in this market. Without cities they would simply not exist. [...] City diversity itself permits
and stimulates more diversity.” (Chapter 7, The Generators of Diversity).
We estimate the correlation between industrial composition (either specialization or diversifica-
tion) using the earliest wave of publicly available data from the County Business Patterns. These
data provide establishment numbers for each Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 2-digit code.
We aggregate such county level data to the boundaries of 2010 Core Based Statistical Areas, the
same boundaries as those of the Neighborhood Change Database – this allows for measuring the
growth of metropolitan areas. To test the specialization hypothesis, we use 2-digit SIC codes,
leading to the following categories: Agriculture, Fishing and Forestry; Metal, Mining and Oil; Con-
struction; Manufacturing; Transportation and Utilities; Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate; Non
Classifiable; Retail. The measure of industrial specialization is the Herfindahl index (HHI), which
is equal to the sum of the squares of the 2-digit SIC industry establishment shares:
HHIm =∑
k
(Sharek)2 , (2)
where m is the metropolitan area, k is the 2-digit SIC code, and Sharek is the proportion of
establishments in industry k. We use the share of establishments as this variable is well filled in the
US Census Bureau’s County Business Patterns. Given the large asymmetry and the fat tails of the
HHI measure, results of the linear regression are more robust when regressing on four indicator
variables for the four quantiles of HHI, from least specialized (Q1), to most specialized (Q4).
• Education
In Moretti (2012), the author describes the diverging paths of Menlo Park and Visalia, CA, and
suggests that Menlo Park experienced significantly stronger growth thanks to its higher share of
educated residents. In the Rise of the Skilled City, Glaeser & Saiz (2003) describes the higher growth
of more educated cities, even after controlling for a range of covariates. This chapter’s measure of
16
education is the fraction of college graduates in 1970, according to the 1970 Census Count 4Pa,
provided by the National Historical Geographic Information System at the University of Minnesota.
• Segregation and Inequality
Our third measure of metropolitan area fundamentals is urban segregation. A number of papers
suggest that urban racial segregation affects welfare. Li, Campbell & Fernandez (2013) argues that
urban segregation has effects on metropolitan economic growth beyond its effects on minorities and
poor residents. Thus urban segregation may be a concern for both distributional and efficiency rea-
sons. Card & Rothstein (2007) suggests that neighborhood segregation has a consistently negative
impact on the SAT scores of black students. Watson, Carlino & Ellen (2006) describes the negative
correlation between income segregation and metropolitan population growth.
We build a measure of Black--White urban segregation in 1970, at the beginning of our time
period. The dissimilarity index measures the difference between the distribution of black residents
across neighborhoods and the distribution of white residents across the same set of neighborhoods.
We use 1970 census tract demographics. The dissimilarity index is a popular measure of segregation,
notably developed in Duncan & Duncan (1955) and used in Cutler, Glaeser & Vigdor (1999). The
dissimilarity measure used in this paper is:
Dm = 1
2
∑
j
∣wm,j
wm
− bm,j
bm
∣ , (3)
where m is one of the 306 metropolitan areas, j indexes neighborhoods, wm,j (resp. bm,j) is the
number of white (resp. black) residents in neighborhood j, wm (resp. bm) the number of white
(resp. black) residents in metropolitan area m. Results using other pairs of races and ethnicities are
available from the author. Notable examples of segregated metropolitan areas include the Chicago-
Naperville-Elgin, IL-IN-WI metropolitan area (0.90), Oklahoma City, OK (0.89), Los Angeles-Long
Beach-Anaheim, CA (0.89), and Detroit-Warren-Dearborn (0.88). Alternative segregation indices
such as the exposure or the normalized exposure indices (Cutler et al. 1999, Ouazad & Rancière 2016)
provide different rankings, yet these three indices are strongly correlated.
• Housing Supply Elasticity
Our final hypothesis is that constraints on housing supply, stemming either from geographic or regu-
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latory constraints, are a barrier to the development of metropolitan areas; they indeed constrain the
growth of the housing stock (Mayer & Somerville 2000, Glaeser, Gyourko & Saks 2006, Saks 2008),
and make housing more expensive for productive workers whose productivity gains are transferred
to the owners of land.
There is a variety of available housing supply elasticity measures, starting with Saiz (2010).
We use recent metro-level elasticity measures from Gorback & Keys (2020), yet using Saiz’s (2010)
measures does not affect the regression estimates. We control for an indicator variable for a missing
elasticity measure, as housing supply elasticity is typically not available for smallest metropolitan
areas.
• Other possible fundamentals
Other fundamentals could be included in a further analysis: innovations measured by the number of
patents per capita (Kerr & Robert-Nicoud 2020), market access and transportation costs (Redding
2010), public transportation infrastructure (Kahn 2007, Gonzalez-Navarro & Turner 2018), the
proximity to deepwater ports (Brooks, Gendron-Carrier & Rua 2018), the flow of credit due to the
structure of the banking sector in the metropolitan area (Clarke 2004, Ouazad & Rancière 2016),
and other fundamentals.
Estimation Results: Shocks and Fundamentals
Results of the analysis are presented in Table 4. The first columns present the covariates separately
(education, industrial composition, segregation, elasticity, shocks), and the last columns performs
the regression with all previous covariates simultaneously. In all 11 regressions the dependent
variable is the change in the metropolitan area population rank between 1970 and 2010. A first
notable fact is the strong correlation of black-white urban segregation, education, and industrial
specialization, with a metropolitan area’s relative growth. More segregated areas grow less than
other, more integrated areas. Metropolitan areas with larger shares of college-educated residents
grow significantly more. Areas with less diverse industrial composition (an HHI in the 4th quartile)
tend to grow significantly less – consistent with Jane Jacobs’ hypothesis. Regressions indicate
that it is the concentration in one or a few industries that predicts urban decline rather than the
specialization in manufacturing.
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Notably, none of the shocks – urban protests and storms – have a statistically significant impact
at 5%. There is no significance whether one looks at the number of riots, whether there is any riot,
the dollar amount of property damages due to storms, the number of storms, or whether there is any
storm. In some cases the sign is as expected: a larger number of riots with damages to property has
a negative impact on a metropolitan area’s population growth; yet the impacts are not significant.
The last column includes all of the previous covariates simultaneously. Interestingly, both ur-
ban segregation and industrial specialization remain strongly significant (at 1%), again consistent
with the central tenets of Jane Jacobs’ the Death and Life of Great American Cities. Shocks re-
main non significant. Perhaps notable is the significance of the housing supply elasticity measure:
when controlling for other fundamentals, metropolitan areas with higher housing supply elasticities
experience significantly higher growth (significant at 5%).
3.2 The Resilience of the New York City Housing Market After September 11
While city rankings by population size are stable, the ranking of neighborhoods tends to fluctuate
substantially over time. Evidence from the Neighborhood Change Database suggests that the
correlation between a tract’s ranking in 1970 and the same population ranking in 2010 is only 0.2.
This suggests that cities may be resilient when urban residents adapt their location and housing
consumption by using the variety of amenities, housing stocks, and access to jobs to respond to
shocks.
September 11 2001 presents a case study for the impact of a terrorist event on the desirability
of living in dense urban spaces. The event had dramatic consequences on the welfare of central
New York City residents: Galea, Ahern, Resnick, Kilpatrick, Bucuvalas, Gold & Vlahov (2002)
suggests that adults experienced symptoms consistent with post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD),
with a prevalence of PTSD up to 20% for those living south of Canal Street near the World Trade
Center. In a set of respondents with an oversampling of children new the World Trade Center,
Hoven, Duarte, Lucas, Wu, Mandell, Goodwin, Cohen, Balaban, Woodruff, Bin et al. (2005) finds
that 29% of children experienced anxiety disorders.
This may have impacts on the New York housing market. In Israël, Elster, Zussman & Zussman
(2017) using hedonic and repeat sales approaches to show that attacks led to a 6 to 7% decline
in house prices and rents. They also find that these effects are perisistent beyond the 2000--2012
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period, and suggest this is consistent with a perception of a continued threat. Bram, Haughwout &
Orr (2004) suggests that the September 11 events caused a sharp contraction of business activity. In
the long run, Eisinger (2004) claims that “few lasting effects on city life are evident,” and suggests
that city dynamics are affected by long-term forces rather than even very significant short term
ones.
We provide quantitative neighborhood-level evidence of the dynamics of housing markets during
and in the aftermath of September 11 using 5-digit ZIP code price data since 1996. We are thus
able to estimate pre-existing trends, the impact of the events during the September to December
2001 period, and during the post 2001 period. We can also test whether these events affected the
desirability of central city living in New York.
Evidence suggests a strong rebound of price growth in the October to December 2002 period
compared to the October to December 2001 period. Monthly year-on-year price appreciation for
the New York MSA as a whole and for the central New York City ZIP codes suggests that prices
increased significantly a year after September 11 2001. There is no immediate discernible negative
impact of September 11 on price appreciation in the New York MSA as a whole, suggesting that
even shocks that a have strong negative impact on residents’ welfare have not been capitalized into
long run house prices.
Yet, Figure 7 does present evidence that September 11 temporarily shifted demand away from
central New York City and to the suburbs. Panel (a) shows that price appreciation is up to twice
stronger in ZIP codes close to the central business district than for neighborhoods in the 10 to
60 kilometer range (6 to 37 miles) from the central business district. This relationship is almost
flipped in September and October 2001, wher price appreciation is larger in ZIP codes farther away
from the Central Business District (CBD) than close to it. Yet, panel (d) suggests this is only a
temporary phenomenon, as price appreciation is again decreasing with the distance to the CBD
between 2002 and 2020. This evidence suggests that while September 2001 did affect the demand
for central New York residential housing, these effects did not last beyond 2001, at least in terms
of price appreciation for residential units in the densest parts of New York.
The dramatic shock of September 2001 also affected the demand for central city residential
housing in other cities. Abadie & Dermisi (2008) suggests that 9/11 increased Chicago’s residents
perception of the probability of terrorist attacks. They show that vacancy rates increased in the
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vicinity of the Sears Tower, the Aon Center, and the Hancock Center. This section’s result do not
however provide evidence of long run impacts of these events on residential housing markets.
3.3 Rebuilding San Francisco After the 1989 Loma Prieta Earthquake
The Loma Prieta earthquake was an earthquake of magnitude 6.9 on the Richter scale that shook
the San Francisco Bay area on October 17, 1989. According to the California Department of
Conservation, it caused 63 fatalities, 3,737 injuries, and 6 billion dollars in property damage. Its
epicenter was only 32.5 miles from Cupertino and 48 miles from Menlo Park, both of which were
and still are, major centers of technological innovation.
A study published in the years following the earthquake (Murdoch, Singh & Thayer 1993)
analyzed the dynamic of house prices in six counties that were affected. The study used all residential
home sales between January 1988 and November 1990. Results controlling for a substantial range
of covariates suggested that the disaster caused an overall decline in property values as well as
a gradient between house prices and measures of earthquake risk such as soil type and seismic
zone designation. Yet, a key question is whether these price declines persisted and whether local
amenities were affected in the long run.
In this last section, we perform an analysis of the long-run impact of the earthquake on neighborhood-
level population flows using data from the California Conservation Department13 on earthquake risk,
and data from the Neighborhood Change Database. In a first step, we estimate the liquefaction risk
for each block of the San Jose-San Francisco-Oakland Combined Statistical area. According to the
Geological Survey, liquefaction takes place “when loosely packed, water-logged sediments at or near
the ground surface lose their strength in response to strong ground shaking.”14 Liquefaction risk
is a predictor of damage to structures (Cubrinovski, Bray, Taylor, Giorgini, Bradley, Wotherspoon
& Zupan 2011, Towhata, Yasuda, Yoshida, Motohashi, Sato & Arai 2016) as the nature of the soil
leads to greater impacts on land at a given earthquake magnitude.
In a second step, we matched such block-level liquefaction data with the Neighborhood Change
Database’s tract level population levels. We compute the share of a tract’s area that is in the
liquefaction area. Prices are harder to analyze over such a long period nevertheless population level
13CGS Information Warehouse: Regulatory Maps.
14“What is liquefaction?”, Natural Hazards, U.S. Geological Survey.
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are an indicator of the immediate impact of the earthquake on living conditions, and long-term
population changes are an indicator of the quality of neighborhood amenities. Owens III, Rossi-
Hansberg & Sarte (2020) argues that neighborhood population levels can decline below a threshold
that yields large amounts of vacancies.
Table 4 indeed suggests that population declined significantly in the immediate aftermath of the
earthquake. Census data was collected in 1990, only a few months after the earthquake that shook
the metropolitan area in October 1989. The first column of the upper panel of the table suggests
that population declined 12% between 1980 and 1990 in tracts that are entirely in the liquefaction
area. This is significant at 1%. The first column of the lower panel provides the regression where
the dependent variable is the tract’s population rank. A tract within the liquefaction area lost 35.9
ranks on average in 1990. Columns 2 and 3 nevertheless suggest that the effect of the earthquake
is relatively short-lived: tracts in the liquefaction area experience no different population growth in
the two decades following the devastating earthquake. There is no straightforward evidence that
the earthquake is a major long-term driver of population dynamics.
This is also clear in Figure 8, which focuses on Mountain View. While a substantial share of
Mountain View is in the liquefaction area, including the headquarters of Google at 1600 Amphithe-
atre Parkway, there is no discernible impact of the liquefaction area on population dynamics. In
other words, a regression discontinuity design at the boundary of such area would likely yield no
significant impact. This suggests that the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake, with damages estimated
to 6 billion dollars (Stover & Coffman 1993), had only a minor impact on the San Francisco Bay
Area’s long term population trend.
4 Conclusion
The total magnitude and the length of both the Covid-19 pandemic and the urban protests are, at
the time of writing this chapter, yet unknown. The past can nevertheless provide a sliver of hope
for the future. The evidence and the literature presented in this chapter suggest that, over the
span of four decades, metropolitan areas are remarkably resilient to shocks – fundamentals rather
than short-run shocks drive long-run population trends. Such resilience of urban housing markets
suggests that the benefits of agglomeration play a key role in residents’ welfare; sharing, matching,
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and learning are key motives that explain the desirability of urban living. These benefits have, over
the long run, arguably been greater than the negative externalities of agglomeration. High levels
of education, a diversified industrial composition, and racially integrated neighborhoods are keys to
the resilience of metropolitan areas.
References
Abadie, A. & Dermisi, S. (2008), ‘Is terrorism eroding agglomeration economies in central business
districts? lessons from the office real estate market in downtown chicago’, Journal of urban
Economics 64(2), 451–463.
Adelino, M., Schoar, A. & Severino, F. (2012), Credit supply and house prices: evidence from
mortgage market segmentation, Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Ambrose, B. W., Coulson, N. E. & Yoshida, J. (2015), ‘The repeat rent index’, Review of Economics
and Statistics 97(5), 939–950.
Bartik, T. J. (1991), ‘Who benefits from state and local economic development policies?’.
Behrens, K. & Robert-Nicoud, F. (2015), Agglomeration theory with heterogeneous agents, in
‘Handbook of regional and urban economics’, Vol. 5, Elsevier, pp. 171–245.
Blanchard, O. J. & Katz, L. F. (1992), ‘Regional evolutions’, Brookings Papers on Economic Activ-
ity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution 23(1).
Boustan, L. P., Kahn, M. E., Rhode, P. W. & Yanguas, M. L. (2020), ‘The effect of natural disasters
on economic activity in us counties: A century of data’, Journal of Urban Economics p. 103257.
Brakman, S., Garretsen, H. & Schramm, M. (2004), ‘The strategic bombing of german cities during
world war ii and its impact on city growth’, Journal of Economic Geography 4(2), 201–218.
Bram, J., Haughwout, A. & Orr, J. (2004), Has september 11 affected new york city’s growth
potential?, in ‘Modeling Spatial and Economic Impacts of Disasters’, Springer, pp. 53–73.
Brooks, L., Gendron-Carrier, N. & Rua, G. (2018), ‘The local impact of containerization’.
23
Card, D. & Rothstein, J. (2007), ‘Racial segregation and the black–white test score gap’, Journal
of Public Economics 91(11-12), 2158–2184.
Case, K. E. & Shiller, R. J. (1987), Prices of single family homes since 1970: New indexes for four
cities, Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Clarke, M. Z. (2004), ‘Geographic deregulation of banking and economic growth’, Journal of Money,
Credit and Banking pp. 929–942.
Collins, W. J. & Margo, R. A. (2007), ‘The economic aftermath of the 1960s riots in american cities:
Evidence from property values’, The Journal of Economic History pp. 849–883.
Combes, P.-P. & Duranton, G. (2006), ‘Labour pooling, labour poaching, and spatial clustering’,
Regional Science and Urban Economics 36(1), 1–28.
Combes, P.-P. & Gobillon, L. (2015), The empirics of agglomeration economies, in ‘Handbook of
regional and urban economics’, Vol. 5, Elsevier, pp. 247–348.
Cubrinovski, M., Bray, J. D., Taylor, M., Giorgini, S., Bradley, B., Wotherspoon, L. & Zupan,
J. (2011), ‘Soil liquefaction effects in the central business district during the february 2011
christchurch earthquake’, Seismological Research Letters 82(6), 893–904.
Cutler, D. M., Glaeser, E. L. & Vigdor, J. L. (1999), ‘The rise and decline of the american ghetto’,
Journal of political economy 107(3), 455–506.
Davis, D. R. &Weinstein, D. E. (2002), ‘Bones, bombs, and break points: the geography of economic
activity’, American Economic Review 92(5), 1269–1289.
Davis, D. R. & Weinstein, D. E. (2008), ‘A search for multiple equilibria in urban industrial struc-
ture’, Journal of Regional Science 48(1), 29–65.
DiPasquale, D. & Glaeser, E. L. (1998), ‘The los angeles riot and the economics of urban unrest’,
Journal of Urban Economics 43(1), 52–78.
Duncan, O. D. & Duncan, B. (1955), ‘A methodological analysis of segregation indexes’, American
sociological review 20(2), 210–217.
24
Duranton, G. & Puga, D. (2004), Micro-foundations of urban agglomeration economies, in ‘Hand-
book of regional and urban economics’, Vol. 4, Elsevier, pp. 2063–2117.
Duranton, G. & Turner, M. A. (2011), ‘The fundamental law of road congestion: Evidence from us
cities’, American Economic Review 101(6), 2616–52.
Eisinger, P. (2004), ‘The american city in the age of terror: A preliminary assessment of the effects
of september 11’, Urban Affairs Review 40(1), 115–130.
Elster, Y., Zussman, A. & Zussman, N. (2017), ‘Rockets: The housing market effects of a credible
terrorist threat’, Journal of Urban Economics 99, 136–147.
Esteban, J. & Ray, D. (2011), ‘Linking conflict to inequality and polarization’, American Economic
Review 101(4), 1345–74.
Favara, G. & Imbs, J. (2015), ‘Credit supply and the price of housing’, American Economic Review
105(3), 958–92.
Francke, M. & Korevaar, M. (2020), Housing markets in a pandemic: Evidence from historical
outbreaks.
Fujita, M. & Thisse, J.-F. (1996), ‘Economics of agglomeration’, Journal of the Japanese and inter-
national economies 10(4), 339–378.
Gabaix, X. (1999), ‘Zipf’s law for cities: an explanation’, The Quarterly journal of economics
114(3), 739–767.
Galea, S., Ahern, J., Resnick, H., Kilpatrick, D., Bucuvalas, M., Gold, J. & Vlahov, D. (2002),
‘Psychological sequelae of the september 11 terrorist attacks in new york city’, New England
journal of medicine 346(13), 982–987.
Gatzlaff, D. H. & Haurin, D. R. (1997), ‘Sample selection bias and repeat-sales index estimates’,
The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics 14(1-2), 33–50.
Glaeser, E. (2011), ‘Triumph of the city: how our greatest invention makes us richer, smarter,
greener, healthier and happier. 2011’.
25
Glaeser, E. L. & Gyourko, J. (2005), ‘Urban decline and durable housing’, Journal of political
economy 113(2), 345–375.
Glaeser, E. L., Gyourko, J. & Saks, R. E. (2006), ‘Urban growth and housing supply’, Journal of
economic geography 6(1), 71–89.
Glaeser, E. L. & Saiz, A. (2003), The rise of the skilled city, Technical report, National Bureau of
Economic Research.
Goldsmith-Pinkham, P., Sorkin, I. & Swift, H. (2018), Bartik instruments: What, when, why, and
how, Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Gonzalez-Navarro, M. & Turner, M. A. (2018), ‘Subways and urban growth: Evidence from earth’,
Journal of Urban Economics 108, 85–106.
Gorback, C. S. & Keys, B. J. (2020), Global capital and local assets: House prices, quantities, and
elasticities, Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Gordon, M. J. & Shapiro, E. (1956), ‘Capital equipment analysis: the required rate of profit’,
Management science 3(1), 102–110.
Harding, J. P., Rosenthal, S. S. & Sirmans, C. (2007), ‘Depreciation of housing capital, maintenance,
and house price inflation: Estimates from a repeat sales model’, Journal of urban Economics
61(2), 193–217.
Hoven, C. W., Duarte, C. S., Lucas, C. P., Wu, P., Mandell, D. J., Goodwin, R. D., Cohen, M.,
Balaban, V., Woodruff, B. A., Bin, F. et al. (2005), ‘Psychopathology among new york city
public school children 6 months after september 11’, Archives of general psychiatry 62(5), 545–
551.
Ioannides, Y. M. & Overman, H. G. (2003), ‘Zipf’s law for cities: an empirical examination’, Regional
science and urban economics 33(2), 127–137.
Justiniano, A., Primiceri, G. E. & Tambalotti, A. (2019), ‘Credit supply and the housing boom’,
Journal of Political Economy 127(3), 1317–1350.
26
Kahn, M. E. (2005), ‘The death toll from natural disasters: the role of income, geography, and
institutions’, Review of economics and statistics 87(2), 271–284.
Kahn, M. E. (2007), ‘Gentrification trends in new transit-oriented communities: evidence from 14
cities that expanded and built rail transit systems’, Real Estate Economics 35(2), 155–182.
Kerr, W. & Robert-Nicoud, F. (2020), ‘Tech clusters’, Journal of Economic Perspectives 34(3).
Koster, H. R., van Ommeren, J. & Rietveld, P. (2012), ‘Bombs, boundaries and buildings: A
regression-discontinuity approach to measure costs of housing supply restrictions’, Regional
Science and Urban Economics 42(4), 631–641.
Li, H., Campbell, H. & Fernandez, S. (2013), ‘Residential segregation, spatial mismatch and eco-
nomic growth across us metropolitan areas’, Urban Studies 50(13), 2642–2660.
Malm, L. & Pomerleau, K. (2015), ‘Comments on who pays? a distributional analysis of the tax
systems in all 50 states’, Fiscal Fact No 447.
Marshall, A. (1890), The Principles of Economics, MacMillan, London.
Mayer, C. J. & Somerville, C. T. (2000), ‘Residential construction: Using the urban growth model
to estimate housing supply’, Journal of urban economics 48(1), 85–109.
Melo, P. C., Graham, D. J. & Noland, R. B. (2009), ‘A meta-analysis of estimates of urban agglom-
eration economies’, Regional science and urban Economics 39(3), 332–342.
Moore, M., Gould, P. & Keary, B. S. (2003), ‘Global urbanization and impact on health’, Interna-
tional journal of hygiene and environmental health 206(4-5), 269–278.
Moretti, E. (2012), The new geography of jobs, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.
Murdoch, J. C., Singh, H. & Thayer, M. (1993), ‘The impact of natural hazards on housing values:
the loma prieta earthquake’, Real Estate Economics 21(2), 167–184.
Olzak, S. & West, E. (1995), ‘Ethnic collective action in contemporary urban US’.
Ouazad, A. & Rancière, R. (2016), ‘Credit standards and segregation’, Review of Economics and
Statistics 98(5), 880–896.
27
Ouazad, A. & Rancière, R. (2019), ‘Market frictions, arbitrage, and the capitalization of amenities’,
NBER Working Paper (w25701).
Owens III, R., Rossi-Hansberg, E. & Sarte, P.-D. (2020), ‘Rethinking detroit’, American Economic
Journal: Economic Policy 12(2), 258–305.
Puga, D. (2010), ‘The magnitude and causes of agglomeration economies’, Journal of regional science
50(1), 203–219.
Redding, S. J. (2010), ‘The empirics of new economic geography’, Journal of regional science
50(1), 297–311.
Rosenthal, S. S. & Strange, W. C. (2004), Evidence on the nature and sources of agglomeration
economies, in ‘Handbook of regional and urban economics’, Vol. 4, Elsevier, pp. 2119–2171.
Saiz, A. (2010), ‘The geographic determinants of housing supply’, The Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 125(3), 1253–1296.
Saks, R. E. (2008), ‘Job creation and housing construction: Constraints on metropolitan area
employment growth’, Journal of Urban Economics 64(1), 178–195.
Singh, G. K. & Siahpush, M. (2014), ‘Widening rural–urban disparities in life expectancy, us, 1969–
2009’, American journal of preventive medicine 46(2), e19–e29.
Stover, C. W. & Coffman, J. L. (1993), Seismicity of the United States, 1568-1989 (revised), US
Government Printing Office.
Towhata, I., Yasuda, S., Yoshida, K., Motohashi, A., Sato, S. & Arai, M. (2016), ‘Qualification of
residential land from the viewpoint of liquefaction vulnerability’, Soil Dynamics and Earthquake
Engineering 91, 260–271.
Watson, T., Carlino, G. & Ellen, I. G. (2006), ‘Metropolitan growth, inequality, and neighborhood
segregation by income [with comments]’, Brookings-Wharton Papers on Urban Affairs pp. 1–52.
Zabel, J. E. (2012), ‘Migration, housing market, and labor market responses to employment shocks’,
Journal of Urban Economics 72(2-3), 267–284.
28
Figure 1: The U.S. Housing Market in 2020: Aggregate Dynamics
Panels (a), (b), (c) provide simple statistics on year-on-year changes in house values, rents, and
inventories for the US (bold line) and for the two largest metropolitan areas (dotted and dashed
lines). Inventories are not available for the same time period as prices. Panel (d) presents two
histograms of price changes in red (resp. rent changes in blue) for the 100 largest metropolitan
areas.
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Figure 2: The U.S. Housing Market in 2020: Explaining the Resilience of Prices
These graphs describe the decline in the rent-to-price ratio, net of maintenance costs and property
taxes (figure (a)), and three key components of the Shapiro-Gordon valuation formula: (b) the 30-
year fixed rate mortgage average, which measures credit costs and affects net rental yields; (c) the
AAA corporate bond yield, a proxy for the yield on capital; and (d) expectations of rent growth.
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Sources: Zillow ZHVI and ZORI for the rent-to-price ratio. Maintenance cost from Harding, Rosen-
thal & Sirmans (2007). Average property tax rate from Malm & Pomerleau (2015). Federal Reserve
of St Louis series DAAA and MORTGAGE30US. Fannie Mae’s July 2020 National Housing Survey.
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Figure 3: The U.S. Housing Market in 2020: Covid-19 Infections and the Housing Market
(a) Confirmed Covid-19 Cases Per Capita across Metro
Areas (b) Covid-19 Cases and Inventories
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Figure 4: Low- and High-Population Density ZIP Codes: Two Typical Examples
These two maps present the layout of buildings and roads in two sample ZIP codes. The ZIP code
of the upper panel is part of New York’s Upper East Side, with a high population density of 53,029
residents per squared kilometers, 18 times that of the ZIP of the lower panel. Such ZIP code includes
the Great Neck Estates on the northern part of Long Island. It has a population density of 2,968
residents per squared kilometers. Maps have different scales.
(a) Higher Density: The Upper East Side, ZIP 10075
(b) Lower Density: Russell Gardens, Great Neck Plaza, Great Neck Es-
tates ZIP 11021
ZIP boundaries projected according to the Census 2010 boundaries. Building footprint and roads
current as of 2020 from Open Street Map. Population counts from the 5-year averages of the 2018
American Community Survey.
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Figure 5: The U.S. Housing Market in 2020: Evidence of Suburbanization
(a) YoY % Price Changes and Distance to the Center,
2019
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(b) YoY % Price Changes and Distance to the Center,
2020
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(c) YoY % Price Changes and Density, 2019
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(d) YoY % Price Changes and Density, 2020
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Figure 6: The U.S. Housing Market in 2020: George Floyd Protests and Urban Housing Markets
(a) The Spatial Extent of the May 2020 Protests
(b) George Floyd Protests in Los Angeles
(c) Comparing Price Appreciation Across Neighbor-
hoods in Los Angeles
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Source: Crowdsourced May 2020 George Floyd protest data through the Wikimedia foundation.
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Figure 7: Within-City Adaptation to Shocks: Short-Run Suburbanization in NYC In September-
December 2001
These four graphs present the average price appreciation (using the ZHVI index) for bins of neigh-
borhoods ordered by their distance to the Central Business District of the New York metropolitan
area. Figures (b) and (c) suggest that the relationship changed sign, before going back to the average
negative gradient observed prior to September 11.
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(b) 2002 to 2020: Higher Price Appreciation in the CBD
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(c) September 2001: Appreciation in the Periphery
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(d) October 2001: Appreciation in the Periphery
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Zip-level ZHVI index from Zillow. Appreciation is month to month in this graph.
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Figure 8: Within-City Adaptation to Shocks: The SF Bay Area After the 1989 Loma Prieta Earth-
quake
Table 4 showed that liquefaction areas, while losing population compared to the rest of the metropoli-
tan area between 1980 and 1990, display no significantly different population growth trend in the
next decades (90s and 2000s). These two maps show that indeed, population growth in 1990–2000
in Mountain View is not discontinuous at the border of the liquefaction area.
(a) Liquefaction Areas (b) Population Changes 1990-2000
Source: California Department of Conservation’s regulatory liquefaction maps (left), matched to
2010 Census blocks. Geolytics Neighborhood Change Database 1990-2000 at the tract level (right).
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Table 1: Confirmed Covid-19 Cases Per Capita and County Demographics
This table correlates county Covid-19 cases per capita with population density and Census demo-
graphics. Regressions include a state fixed effect.
Dependent Variable: Confirmed Covid-19 Cases Per Capita
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
log(Density) 0.13∗∗∗ 0.04∗ 0.03∗ 0.04∗∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Median Age −0.06∗∗∗ −0.03∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
log(Median household income) −0.15 0.45∗∗ 0.53∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗(0.09) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16)
Frac. Black 2.47∗∗∗ 2.37∗∗∗ 2.45∗∗∗ 2.48∗∗∗ 2.47∗∗∗ 2.47∗∗∗(0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17)
Frac. Hispanic 3.31∗∗∗ 3.32∗∗∗ 3.00∗∗∗ 3.01∗∗∗ 3.08∗∗∗ 3.08∗∗∗(0.18) (0.18) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19)
Frac. Asian −0.88 −1.38 −1.20 −1.05 −1.29 −1.29(0.77) (0.77) (0.77) (0.79) (0.79) (0.79)
Frac poverty 2.66∗∗∗ 1.75∗∗ 1.77∗∗ 1.44∗∗ 1.44∗∗(0.54) (0.55) (0.55) (0.55) (0.55)
Frac. no health coverage 2.73∗∗∗ 2.72∗∗∗ 2.57∗∗∗ 2.57∗∗∗(0.38) (0.38) (0.38) (0.38)
Frac owner occupied 0.23 −0.32 −0.32(0.29) (0.30) (0.30)
Frac mobile home 1.60∗∗∗ 1.60∗∗∗(0.27) (0.27)
Num. observations 3220 3220 3219 3219 3219 3219 3219 3219
R2 (full model) 0.38 0.42 0.51 0.51 0.52 0.52 0.53 0.53
R2 (proj model) 0.03 0.10 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.26
Adj. R2 (full model) 0.37 0.41 0.50 0.50 0.51 0.51 0.52 0.52
Adj. R2 (proj model) 0.01 0.09 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.25 0.25
Num. of State Fixed Effects 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52∗∗∗p < 0.001; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗p < 0.05
Sources: County-level confirmed cases as of August 20, 2020, from the Johns Hopkins Coronavirus
Research Center. County population and other demographic characteristics from the 2018 American
Community Survey. Density is the ratio of ACS population over the area of the county in squared
kilometers using the Census Bureau’s boundary shapefile and the U.S. National Atlas 2163 projected
coordinate reference system.
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Table 2: Within-City Adaptation: Short-Run Suburbanization in New York, March-July 2020
This table uses the ZIP-month Zillow House Value Index (ZHVI) for the Zip codes of the New
York-Newark-Jersey City, NY-NJ-PA Metropolitan Statistical Area to regress the year-on-year ap-
preciation (in logs) on the distance to the center (upper panel) and the logarithm of population
density (lower panel). The distance to the center is the kilometer distance from the centroid of
the Zip code tabulation area to the central business district. Population density computed using the
Census Bureau’s 2018 American Community Survey and the 2010 boundaries of Census Zip code
tabulation areas.
Dependent variable: YoY Price Appreciation
Time period 2015–2019 March-July 2019 March-July 2020
(Intercept) −1.116∗∗∗ −0.622 2.523∗∗∗(0.208) (0.782) (0.816)
log(density) 0.032 0.179∗∗ −0.327∗∗∗(0.021) (0.091) (0.094)
Additional controls Year fixed effects
R2 0.013 0.007 0.022
Adj. R2 0.012 0.005 0.020
Num. obs. 13439 581 541
Dependent variable: YoY Price Appreciation
Time period: 2015–2019 March-July 2019 March-July 2020
(Intercept) −0.750∗∗∗ 1.067∗∗∗ −0.806∗∗∗(0.102) (0.204) (0.211)
Distance to center (km) −0.004∗∗∗ −0.007 0.023∗∗∗(0.001) (0.005) (0.006)
Additional controls Year fixed effects
R2 0.013 0.003 0.024
Adj. R2 0.013 0.001 0.022
Num. obs. 13439 581 541
∗∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗p < 0.1
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Table 4: After a Shock: Population Changes in the San Francisco Bay Area After the 1989 Loma
Prieta Earthquake
These six regressions present the regression of decennial log population change (upper panel) and
population rank (lower panel) on the share of a tract in an earthquake liquefaction area.
∆ Census Tract log Population
1990–1980 2000–1990 2010–2000
(Intercept) 0.29∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗(0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
% in liquefaction area −0.12∗∗ −0.01 −0.01(0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
R2 0.01 0.01 0.01
Adj. R2 0.01 0.01 0.01
Num. obs. 1,791 1,791 1,791
∆ Census Tract Population Rank
1990–1980 2000–1990 2010–2000
(Intercept) 7.81 −1.26 1.86(7.64) (6.61) (9.20)
% in liquefaction area −35.90∗ 5.81 −8.57(18.01) (15.59) (21.69)
R2 0.01 0.01 0.01
Adj. R2 0.01 0.01 0.01
Num. obs. 1,791 1,791 1,791∗∗∗p < 0.001; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗p < 0.05
Source: California Department of Conservation’s regulatory liquefaction maps. Neighborhood
Change Database with 2010 Census Tract Boundaries.
40
